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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine the characteristics of leaked-gas dispersion in 
ship to ship LNG bunkering, thereby providing an insight towards determining the 
appropriate level of safety zones in which the potential hazards pertinent to LNG 
bunkering are required to be minimized. For this purpose, parametric studies are 
undertaken in various operational and environmental conditions, with varying geometry 
of the bunkering ship, gas leak rate, wind speed and wind direction. The study applies 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations for case-specific scenarios where a 
hypothetical LNG bunkering ship with a capacity of 5,100 m3 in tank space is considered 
to refuel two typical types of large-ocean going vessels: an 18,000 TEU containership 
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and a 319,000 DWT very large crude oil carrier. Research findings reveal that the gas 
leak rate and leak duration would be the parameters with the most influence in 
determining the extent of safety zones. It is pointed out that other parameters such as ship 
geometry, wind speed, and wind direction are also influential parameters. Details of the 
computations and discussions are presented. 
 
Keywords: LNG fuelled ship; LNG bunkering; Ship to ship LNG bunkering; Gas leaks; 
Safety zone 
1. Introduction 
LNG (liquefied natural gas) has been acknowledged as one of the most credible 
substitutes for conventional liquid marine fuel sources in response to stringent 
international/local regulations (Aymelek et al. 2015; IGU 2017; IMO 2014). Since the 
world¶V first LNG fuelled ship (LFS) emerged in 2000, the market for LFS¶V has steadily 
grown over the past two decades. As of 2017, more than two hundred LFS¶s have been 
either contracted or operated (Ship & Bunker 2017). This trend brings about the optimistic 
anticipation that LFSs will account for 30 % of new global shipbuilding projects by 2025 
(/OR\G¶V5HJLVWHU 
LNG bunkering, an essential process for LFSs, can be technically categorized by the 
following three methods: truck to ship (TTS), ship to ship (STS) and pipeline to ship 
(PTS). Until now, TTS has been the most common method due to its high accessibility 
and operating convenience. Since LFSs continue to grow in size, STS and PTS have 
drawn more attention from stakeholders who strive to find practicable bunkering methods 
to meet the demands of increasing bunkering capacity. Despite almost unlimited 
bunkering capacity, the PTS method is somewhat constrained by the need for land 
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acquisition to build a bunkering infrastructure. These problems include not only social 
but also economic burdens. On the other hand, STS has emerged as the most practical 
way to ensure high bunkering volumes and good access without regional restrictions 
(Ship-technology 2017; Schuler 2017; Ship & Bunker 2016). 
LNG, on the other hand, is a cryogenic liquid and typically stored in an adiabatic 
storage tank. Unwanted events related to LNG release from any part of the system may 
lead to several potential threats such as asphyxiation, cryogenic burns, structural damage, 
rapid phase transitions (RPT) and even fires and explosions when the leaked gas meets a 
source of ignition (ISO 2015; Crowl and Louvar 2001). Moreover, these initial incidents 
often lead to a larger chain of accidents (IMO 2015; Lasse 2015). 
With the advent of LNG-fuelled ships since 2000, International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has introduced an µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RGH RI 6DIHW\ IRU 6KLSV XVLQJ
Gases or other Low-IODVKSRLQW)XHOV¶ (IGF Code) in an effort to preserve the safety of 
these new types of commercial ships. Given that LNG bunkering is an inevitable process 
which may pose higher risk than the conventional bunkering for oil products, the IGF 
Code does not deal with specific guidelines for enhancing the safety of LNG bunkering 
(IMO 2017). As a result, safety insights into LNG bunkering have been divisive. 
To ensure the safety of personnel during the LNG bunkering, ISO/TS 18683 (ISO 
2015) recommends establishing a safety zone within which the access of all non-essential 
personnel for the bunkering is to be stringently restricted. However, the ISO standards 
are limited to the provision of general information and do not offer quantified guidance. 
Local regulations, class rules and industry guidelines are primarily the same as the ISO 
standards for the safety of LNG bunkering. Jeong et al. (2017b), however, pointed out the 
need for more quantified guidelines to determine the extent of safety zones for LNG 
bunkering, addressing the pitfalls of the current regulations. The study emphasized that 
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the development of quantified guidelines is an urgent and essential task for safer 
bunkering. 
Meanwhile, there have been several studies investigating the risk of marine LNG 
systems. Davies and Fort (2014) LQ/OR\G¶VRegister group have examined the likelihood 
of LNG release. Elsayed et al. (2009) applied a multi-attribute risk assessment 
methodology to LNG carriers during loading/offloading at terminals. Arnet (2014) 
carried out a quantitative risk assessment of LNG bunkering operations, while DNVGL 
(2014) investigated the risk pertinent to probable leakage accidents with the aid of 
PHAST software. Sun et al. (2017) performed CFD simulations to estimate the 
consequential levels of LNG spillage during STS bunkering. Jeong et al. (2017a) 
investigated the risk of a high-pressure fuel gas supply system (HP-FGSS) fitted to a 
conceptual LNG fuelled ore carrier from the standpoint of structural safety against vapour 
cloud explosions. Using FLACS CFD tool, Pedersen and Midda (2012) conducted a 
series of simulations for vented gas explosions. Fan et al.  (2016) have estimated the 
proper extent of the safety zone of an LNG bunkering vessel with the LNG storage 
capacity of 10,000 m3 which is transferred to an LNG fuelled 18,000 TEU container ship. 
Despite the voluminous research, their focuses were too case-specific to obtain a 
general insight into major or minor elements that may contribute to influencing the safety 
of LNG bunkering, thereby determining the extent of the safety zone. Instead, research 
findings from those studies are more relevant to individual circumstances than general 
ones. As a result, in the course of investigating the risk of STS LNG bunkering and 
quantifying the extent of the safety zone, IMO member states have yet to develop their 
own regulations applicable to all LNG fuelled ships. 
The shortcomings of the previous studies and current regulations have motivated the 
carrying out of this paper. In this context, the present research was focused on 
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investigating characteristics of leaked-gas dispersion in STS LNG bunkering in order to 
identify the significant parameters influencing the extent of the safety zone for LNG 
bunkering. Case studies were carried out with two typical ocean-going cargo ships: a 
container ship with the capacity to carry 18,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) and 
a very large crude-oil carrier (VLCC) with 319,000 dead weight tonnage (DWT). These 
ships were assumed to be subjected to STS bunkering through an LNG bunkering vessel 
with the capacity to store and carry 5,100 m3. The risk assessment followed a generic and 
deterministic approach to estimate the level of safety zones for the case ships. By 
identifying the critical parameters influencing the enlargement of the safety zone, this 
work is aimed at providing the insights of ship-owners and flag authorities into the 
estimation of appropriate safety zones during LNG bunkering, playing a role as a 
preliminary study in the hopes of contributing to enhancing current international 
regulations. 
2. Procedure of the Study 
2.1. Parametric studies 
During LNG bunkering, an unwanted LNG leakage may happen in the form of jet release 
which would form flammable gas disperses across surroundings (ISO 2015). Therefore, 
the personnel within an area where the level of gas concentration is high enough to be 
flammable are deemed to be at risk. 
To understand the physical behaviour of LNG leakage and dispersion, this paper 
performs a series of parametric analysis where the influence of various parameters on the 
characteristics of leaked-gas dispersion and the extent of safety zones is investigated. 
Figure 1 shows the procedure applied for the present study. 
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Figure 1. Flow of the present study.  
Four parameters, namely ship geometry, leakage rate, wind speed, and winder 
direction are selected for the parametric studies. Different structural outlines of the two 
case ships are applied to investigate the geometric sensitivity on gas dispersion, while 
their loading conditions are also considered accordingly. Several leak scenarios are 
considered to investigate the relationship between the leakage rate and the extent of the 
safety zone. Various wind speeds and directions are considered to examine their 
parametric influences on the safety zone. In this regard, wind speeds are varied at 6 m/s 
(harsh), 4 m/s (normal) and 2 m/s (mild), whereas the four representative wind directions, 
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namely North, East, South, and West are considered.  
The impacts of gas dispersion in various individual leak scenarios are assessed using 
FLACS Ver. 10.5, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) method (Gant and Hoyes 
2010). Based on past studies and software guidelines (Gexcon AS 2016; Hjertager 1985; 
Patankar 1980; Launder & Spalding 1974), the Reynolds averaged Naiver-Stokes 
equations coupled with the k-İ model for turbulence equations are applied for the present 
simulations. 
The critical distance and area in relation to the flammable gas dispersion are defined 
where the gas concentration is higher than LFL (lower flammable limit) of natural gas. 
According to DNV guidelines (DNV 2012), the leak duration is assumed to be 90 seconds 
corresponding to the working time of the ESD valve (60 seconds for detection and 
activation, 30 seconds for quarantine). Since the effects of gas dispersion may vary 
depending on the passage of time, the critical distances and areas are investigated at two 
leak durations, i.e., with 45s and 90s. The annual average temperature is assumed to be 
15 ଇ for the CFD modelling input values. In all cases, the direction of the initial leakage 
is considered to be towards the East. The details in simulation conditions are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. General information of the CFD modelling condition. 
Analysis 
Duration 
Leakage 
Duration 
Wind Build-up 
Time 
Reference 
Height 
of the Wind 
Ambient 
Temperature 
Leakage Direction 
at the Initial Leak 
Hole 
110 Seconds 90 Seconds 10 Seconds 10 m 15 ଇ West Æ East 
Simulation 
Volume Sizes 
[m] 
Boundary 
Condition 
[X,Y,Z] 
Courant-
Friedrichs-Levy 
Number 
Grid Size 
[minimum] 
Grid Size 
[maximum] 
 
( 800, 380, 
200 ) 
Wind(Outflow) 
& 
Nozzle(Inflow) 
CFLV:5~20  
CFLC:1~2 
0.28 m 20 m  
 
From the simulations, the critical distance and area for each case can be observed. 
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The measured critical distances and areas are directly used to represent the extent of the 
safety zones. These results obtained from various scenarios are then collected and plotted 
in the diagram as a convenient format for comparison across the scenarios. This paper 
then investigates the parametric sensitivity in determining the extent of the safety zone. 
2.2. Technical reference of CFD 
2.2.1. Governing equation 
Mathematical models for compressible fluid flow used in FLACS software are described 
as below. 
Conservation of mass:  
( ) ( )v j j
j
m
u
t x V
E U E Uw w  w w                (1) 
where jE  is the porosity, ju  is the mean velocity [m/s], vE  is the volume porosity, m  is 
the mass rate [kg/s], U  is density [kg/m3] and V is the volume [m3]. 
Momentum equation:  
, , 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v i j i j v j ij o i w i v i
j i j
p
u u u F F g
t x x x
E U E U E E V E U Uw w w w       w w w w              (2) 
where ,w iF  is the Àow resistance due to walls, ijV  is the stress tensor, ,o iF  is the Àow 
resistance due to sub-grid obstructions, p  is the absolute pressure [Pa], x  is the 
concentration ratio of gas [mol/mol] and t  is the time [s]. 
2.2.2. Turbulence model 
Turbulence is modelled by a two-HTXDWLRQPRGHOWKHNíƃ model. It is an eddy viscosity 
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model that solves two additional transport equations; one for turbulent kinetic energy and 
the other for dissipation of turbulent kinetic energy. Following Boussinesq eddy viscosity 
assumption, an eddy viscosity models the Reynolds stress tensor as follows: 
2
( )
3
ji
i j eff ij
j i
uu
u u k
x x
U P U Gwwcc cc   w w                (3) 
where U  is the density [kg/m3], ,i ju u  are the mean velocities [m/s], effP  is the effective 
viscosity [Pa·s], ,i jx x  are the concentration ratios of gas [mol/mol], k is the turbulent 
kinetic energy [m2/s2] and ijG  is the Kronecker delta function. 
A few constants are included in the equations mentioned above. In FLACS code, the 
set of constants indicated in Table 2 are used as discussed by Launder and Spalding 
(1974). 
Table 2. A set of constants used for the turbulence model. ܿఓ ܿଵఌ ܿଶఌ ܿଷఌ 
0.09 1.44 1.92 0.8 
 
2.2.3. Wall functions 
%RXQGDU\OD\HUVDUHUHJLRQVLQWKHÀRZ¿HOGFORVHWRZDOOVDQGREVWUXFWLRQVZKHUHWKHUH
are steep gradients and peak values for turbulent kinetic energy and its dissipation rate. 
Very close to the wall surface viscous forces dominate over inertial effects. The 
motivation for using wall-IXQFWLRQV LV WR PRGHO WKH LQÀXHQFH RI WKH ZDOO DW D SRLQW D
certain distance from the wall.  
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2.2.4. Wind boundary 
Wind boundary reproduces the properties of the atmospheric boundary layer close to 
(DUWK¶VVXUIDce. Monin & Obukhov developed a theory to explain buoyancy effects on 
WKHDWPRVSKHULFERXQGDU\OD\HUDQGGH¿QHGDFKDUDFWHULVWLFOHQJWKVFDOH 
*3
a p a
s
c T u
L
gH
U
N                 (4) 
where, T  is the turbulent, N  is the Von Karman constant, *u  is the friction velocity [m/s], 
g  is the gravitational acceleration [m/s2] and sH  is the sensible heat flux from the surface. 
The Monin-Obukhov length is a measure of the stability of the atmospheric boundary 
layer. 
3. Parametric Studies 
3.1. Target ships 
The specification of the target ships and the bunkering vessel are summarized in Table 3. 
The freeboard of the container ship is 17.2 m, while that of the VLCC is 9.7 m. In the full 
load condition, the depth of the container ship, including the height of the four layers of 
stacked container cargo, is estimated at 48.78 m. 
According to the Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied 
Gases (CDI et al. 2013), the fender size between the LFS and bunkering vessel can be 
calculated using Equation (5). As indicated in Table 4, the results of calculations reveal 
that the 4 pieces (3.3 m x 6.5 m) of fender should be arranged accordingly. Figures 2 to 
4 show the geometry model of the case ships and the bunkering vessel. 
2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Displacement of the ship A Displacement of the ship B
C
Displacement of the ship A Displacement of the ship B
u u                 (5) 
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Table 3. General information of the target ships 
Principle Particulars 
18,000 TEU  
Container Ship 
 (Case Ship 1) 
319,000 DWT 
VLCC 
 (Case Ship 2) 
5,100 m3  
LNG Bunkering 
Vessel 
L x B x D x d [m] 399 × 58.6 × 33.2 × 16.0 336 × 60 × 30.5 × 20.8 107.6 × 18.4 × 9 × 4.7 
LNG Fuel Tank Volume 
[m3] 
6,000 (full) / 5,100 (Operating) 5,100 
[Note] L=Length, B=Breadth, D=Depth and d=draft 
Table 4. Results of Fender size calculations. 
Criteria: 
Berthing Coefficient 
(C) 
[Tonnes] 
Suggested 
Fenders 
[Quantity] 
Typical HP 
Pneumatic Fender 
(50kPa)  
[m] 
Calculated (C): 
Case Ship 1 
(Container Ship) 
[Tonnes] 
Calculated (C): 
 Case Ship 2 
(VLCC) 
[Tonnes] 
10,000 3 or more 2.5 x 5.5 
14,760 14,640 
30,000 4 or more 3.3 x 6.5 
 
 
Figure 2. Geometry of target ship 1 (container ship) in full load condition. 
 
Figure 3. Geometry of target ship 1 (container ship) in ballast condition. 
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Figure 4. Geometry of target ship 2 (VLCC class tanker). 
3.2. Effect of leak rate (leak amount) 
The gauge pressure inside the LNG bunkering system is considered at 3 bar (g), and the 
boiling point of LNG at the pressure is about -141 Ȕ (Jeong et al. 2017b; DNV 2012). 
The density of LNG at the proposed pressure and temperature is assumed to be 392 kg/m3. 
The discharge coefficient is taken as 0.62 for a sharp-edged leakage hole. Using Equation 
(6) below, the leakage rate at the initial leakage point can be calculated. 
2 gQ C A pU u u u u                (6) 
where Q is the leak rate [kg/s], C is the discharge coefficient, A is the cURVVVHFWLRQDODUHD
RIWKHOHDNSRLQW>P@ȡLNG is the density of LNG [kg/m3], and Pg is the guague pressure 
inside the pipe [Pa]. 
Table 5. Leak rate depending on leak hole (size). 
Leak Hole 
Diameter 
[mm] 
Discharge 
Coefficient 
Density 
[kg/m3] 
Leak Area 
[m2] 
Leak Rate 
[kg/s] 
50 
0.62 392 
1.96E-03 1.87E+01 
150 1.77E-02 1.68E+02 
250 4.91E-02 4.66E+02 
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Due to the high pressure in operation, an LNG leak is likely to be a jet. As a realistic 
phenomenon, part of the leaked liquid would immediately evaporate under the ambient 
condition, which can be described as the µIODVKLQJ HIIHFW
. This effect is generally 
determined by the properties of the material and operating conditions such as storage 
temperature, the typical boiling point, the heat capacity of the gas and the latent heat of 
evaporation. 
In this context, as described in Figure 5, the concept of flash utility is introduced to 
supplement the limitations of CFD where it is technically impossible to model and 
simulate the entire process ranging from the initial LNG leak, evaporation and gas 
dispersion at once. Meanwhile, the flash utility provides the most realistic and technically 
feasible alternative to calculate the leak area, flow rate, and equivalent rate (fuel 
concentration) at Xf where the initial LNG leak is completely vaporized. Then, the 
simulations directly deal with the effect of gas dispersion with the flow of gas-air mixture 
estimated at Xf. 
Calculation results are summarized in Table 6. It is noted that the leak rate at the initial 
hole represents the pure LNG leak rate, whereas the flow rate at Xf represents the flow of 
the gas mixture added with air which is significantly higher than the initial flow of the 
leaked LNG.  
On the other hand, the equivalence ratio represents the mixture ratio (concentration 
ratio) between the gas and air at Xf. It can be defined as the ratio of the mass of fuel to 
the mass of oxygen, divided by the ratio of the mass of fuel to the mass of oxygen at the 
stoichiometric concentration as indicated in Equation (7). In this paper, the equivalence 
ratio value at Xf is calculated as 7.39.     
( / )
( / )
fuel oxygen
fuel oxygen stoichiometric
mass mass
Equivalence Ratio
mass mass
 
               (7) 
14 
 
 
Figure 5. Flash description in a liquefied gas leakage accident (Gexcon 2017). 
Table 6. Results of flow rate calculations at the entrained point using flash utility. 
Leak Hole 
Diameter 
[mm] 
Ambient 
Temperature 
[ଇ] 
Equivalence 
Ratio at Xf 
Distance 
from Initial Leak Hole 
to Entrained Leak Point 
[m] 
Jet Leak 
Area 
at Xf 
[m2] 
Flow Rate 
at Xf 
[kg/s] 
50 
15 7.39 
6.24E+00 1.39E+00 6.22E+01 
150 1.87E+01 1.25E+01 5.60E+02 
250 3.12E+01 3.47E+01 1.55E+03 
 
To investigate the effect of the leakage amount on determining the level of the safety 
zone, two parameters, namely leak rate, and its duration are varied while the wind speed 
and direction are fixed at 6 m/s and north. Table 7 indicates the relationship between the 
leakage amount and maximum critical distance (represented by the maximum length of 
gas reaching the flammable level) and the critical area (designated by the gas dispersion 
area within the flammable level). Given the lack of quantified guidelines safety zone is 
to be established in accordance with the level of the maximum critical distance and the 
area, the results of analysis reveal that both high leak rate and prolonged leak isolation 
would lead to extending the safety zone. 
On the other hand, research results also show that the VLCC tanker in open 
surrounding condition tends to have a higher level of maximum critical distances and 
areas than the container ship in full load condition (in congested surrounding condition). 
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This means that the severity of flammable dispersion is higher in open spaces than in 
congested spaces; it can be perceived that the gas spreads out quickly and widely in open 
spaces while congested surroundings are more likely to capture the gas within the limited 
space than open surroundings. As a result, the maximum critical distance and area subject 
to the safety zone are more extensive for open spaces than congested spaces in general. It 
is also important to mention that the container ship in the full load condition is relatively 
more influenced by the leakage amount than the VLCC tanker. This points out that the 
congestion level is also a sensitive parameter to extend the safety zone. 
Table 7. Maximum critical distance under various leak amounts for container ship-
VLCC tanker 
Leak Hole 
Diameter 
[mm] 
Leakage 
Duration 
[sec] 
Geometry 
Maximum 
Critical  
Distance 
[m] 
Critical 
Area 
[m2] 
Dispersion Plot 
250  
(466.0 kg/s) 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
204 9,831 
 
VLCC 266 25,478 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
380 23,665 
VLCC 399 47,991 
150 
(168.0 kg/s) 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
205 3,311 
 
VLCC 275 12,098 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
326 10,690 
VLCC 318 13,095 
50 
(18.7 kg/s) 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
75 473 
 
VLCC 175 1,839 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
171 1,638 
VLCC 223 2,930 
 
3.3. Effect of wind speed 
Given the fact that wind speed varies with time and area, a parametric analysis was carried 
out to investigate the effect of wind speed. As setting up new conditions where a 
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maximum leak rate of 466.0 kg/s (250 mm leak hole dia.) and the Northerly wind 
direction with two leak durations, 45s, and 90s were considered to be the fixed 
parameters. Under this condition, three wind speeds - 6 m/s (harsh), 4 m/s (normal) and 
2 m/s (mild) were applied as variables.  
Table 8. Maximum critical distance under various wind speeds for container ship-
VLCC tanker 
Wind 
Speed 
[m/s] 
Leakage 
Duration 
[sec] 
Geometry 
Maximum 
Critical  
Distance 
[m] 
Critical 
Area 
[m2] 
Dispersion Plot 
6 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
204 9,831 
 
VLCC 266 25,478 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
380 23,665 
VLCC 399 47,991 
4 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
291 15,415 
 
VLCC 301 32,000 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
403 25,730 
VLCC 389 57,464 
2 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
336 36,845 
 
VLCC 310 52,071 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
454 59,694 
VLCC 482 109,581 
 
Results show that, in the mild wind conditions, the maximum critical distances and 
areas for both ships are much greater than the high wind speed cases. This is because the 
moderate wind speed leads the gas dispersion to be slow and smooth, thus creating a much 
higher level of flammability in the subject area. Therefore, it is concluded that the lower 
wind speed led to the more direct and longer critical distance and the wider area. 
However, under the same atmospheric conditions, the results for the VLCC tanker are 
more severe than the container ship in full load condition. The results of the analysis 
reveal that wind speed would have a significant influence on the expansion of the safety 
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zone. Also, it may be worthwhile highlighting that the impact of the wind speed is also 
influenced to some extent by the surrounding conditions. 
 
3.4. Effect of wind directions 
Table 9 summarizes the results of the analysis to investigate the influence of wind 
directions on the fixed condition of the maximum leak rate (466.0 kg/s at 250 mm leak 
hole dia.) and the wind speed (6 m/s). In addition to the Northerly wind direction, as a 
reference case, three other representative wind directions are considered in East, South 
and West.  As with other cases, the direction of the leak is considered to be from West to 
East. 
In the Easterly wind, it is found from the analysis that the critical distances and the 
areas are relatively small. This is because the wind direction is opposite to the direction 
of the gas discharge from the leakage hole. In the Southerly wind, the maximum critical 
distance turned out to be more extensive, but the critical area was set up less than in most 
of the Easterly wind scenarios. However, such trend was entirely invalid for the container 
ship in full load condition (congested space) in which the pile of on-board cargo is proven 
to be an object to hinder the gas spreading freely above the deck. 
On the other hand, in the condition of the Westerly wind, the most critical results in 
both maximum distance and area are estimated. This is because the wind direction is the 
same as the direction of a gas leak. In other words, it can be said that the influence of the 
wind direction would be closely related to the direction of gas ejection. 
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Table 9. Maximum critical distance under various wind directions for container ship-
VLCC tanker 
Wind 
Direction 
Leakage 
Duration 
[sec] 
Geometry 
Maximum 
Critical  
Distance 
[m] 
Critical 
Area 
[m2] 
Dispersion Plot 
North 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
204 9,831 
 
VLCC 266 25,478 
90 
Container Ship 
(Full Loading) 
380 23,665 
VLCC 399 47,991 
East 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
285 16,424 
 
VLCC 318 23,815 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
326 34,214 
VLCC 383 46,620 
South 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
399 33,444 
 
VLCC 287 19,963 
90 
Container Ship 
(Full Loading) 
420 30,369 
VLCC 428 35,279 
West 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
621 51,934 
 
VLCC 663 75,520 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
691 92,073 
VLCC 853 121,254 
 
3.5. Effect of geometric difference due to the loading condition 
To investigate the effect of the surrounding circumstances, unload condition (ballast 
condition) of the container ship is considered in the analysis additionally. The results in 
the full load condition are compared with those in the ballast condition. Table 10 
summarizes the results. 
For all wind direction cases in a leak duration of 90s, the container ship in ballast 
condition has more extensive maximum critical distance than the container ship in full 
load condition, except for the Southerly wind case where the on-board cargo plays a role 
in mitigating the impact of wind in the full load condition. Therefore, the computed results 
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show that the open surrounding condition would generally be more critical than the 
congested surrounding condition regarding the formation of flammable gas in the event 
of an accidental leakage. 
Table 10. Maximum critical distance under various wind directions for container ship-
containership 
Wind 
Direction 
Leakage 
Duration 
[sec] 
Geometry 
Maximum 
Critical  
Distance 
[m] 
Critical 
Area 
[m2] 
Dispersion Plot 
North 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
204 9,831 
 
Container 
(Ballast Cond) 
292 20,282 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
380 23,665 
Container 
(Ballast Cond) 
381 47,980 
East 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
285 16,424 
 
Container  
(Ballast Cond) 
267 14,720 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
326 34,214 
Container  
(Ballast Cond) 
383 33,195 
South 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
399 33,444 
 
Container  
(Ballast Cond) 
269 22,929 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
420 30,369 
Container  
(Ballast Cond) 
396 36,493 
West 
45 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
621 51,934 
 
Container 
(Ballast Cond) 
636 54,949 
90 
Container (Full 
Load Cond) 
691 92,073 
Container 
(Ballast Cond) 
726 93,909 
 
4. Discussion on Determining the Safety Zone 
The present study has driven the fact that the range of the maximum critical distance and 
area across various accidental conditions would significantly vary. For the worst case 
scenario where the VLCC was subjected to the 90s LNG leak with the full leak (466.0 
kg/s at 250 mm leak hole diameter) in the Easterly wind at 6 m/s, the maximum critical 
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distance and area were estimated at 853 m and 121,254 m2 respectively. For the container 
ship in full load condition, the safety zone could be as low as 75 m in distance and 473 
m2 in the area when subjected to the 45s LNG leak with small leak (18.7 kg/s at 50 mm 
leak hole diameter) condition with the Southerly wind at 6 m/s. 
The results of the parametric studies show that the impact of the leakage amount 
would be significant in determining the safety zone as presenting both a high leakage rate 
and leakage duration result in more extensive critical distances and areas to be set in 
general. Results reveal that the wind speed also has a critical impact on extending the 
safety zone, but the tendency is inversely proportional; the higher wind speed led to 
smaller critical zones. 
In short, this research recommends that if the LNG bunkering conditions are likely to 
face a high level of leakage rate and duration, extensive safety zones may be required; it 
implies that large-scale LNG bunkering may need more extensive safety zones. The 
reverse is also true. Table 11 and 12 summarize the research findings. 
Table 11. Comparison of the case ships regarding the safety zone level under the 
various leak rates. 
Leak Hole Dia. 250 mm 150 mm 50 mm 
Leak Rate Large Normal Small 
Recommended 
Safety Zone 
Large Mid Small 
 
Table 12. Comparison of the case ships regarding the safety zone level under the 
various wind speeds. 
Wind Speed 6 m/s 4 m/s 2 m/s 
Extent Harsh Normal Mild 
Recommended 
Safety Zone 
Small Mid Large 
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Table 13. Comparison of the case ships regarding the safety zone level under the 
various wind directions. 
Wind Direction 
Wind in Opposite Direct. 
to Gas Ejection 
Wind in Perpendicular 
Direct. to Gas Ejection 
Wind in Same Direct. 
to Gas Ejection 
Dispersion Effect Small Normal Large 
Recommended 
Safety Zone 
Small Mid Large 
 
The results of the case studies to investigate the effects of wind directions reveal that 
the safety zone may need to be set broadly when the wind direction is in the same direction 
with that of the gas discharge from the leak hole. The results associated with the analysis 
of the impact of wind direction show that the surrounding condition (congested or open) 
has a critical influence on determining the level of the safety zone. If a gas leak is more 
likely to occur in an open space, the impact of gas dispersion will be severe. In this 
context, the general recommendations for establishing safety zones can be derived 
concerning the congestion ratio of the subject area where the leaked gas would spread as 
indicated in Table 14. Hence, the VLCC tanker with the lowest congestion ratio (Case 
ship 2) needs to establish a larger safety zone than that for the container ship (Case ship 
1). Since the congestion ratio of the container ships in ballast condition is lower than that 
of the container ship in full load condition, a wider safety zone for the container ship in 
ballast condition needs to be recommended. 
Table 14. Comparison of the case ships regarding the safety zone level under the 
different congestion ratios. 
Ship Geometry 
Target ship 1 
(Container- Full loading) 
Target ship 1 
(Container-Ballast) 
Target ship 2 
(VLCC) 
Congestion Ratio High Mid Low 
Recommended 
Safety Zone 
Small Mid Large 
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5. Concluding Remarks and Further Studies 
The safety zone for enhancing the safety of LNG bunkering needs to be established along 
with the space between the LNG fuelled ship and the bunkering vessel. Given the lack of 
quantified guidelines for establishing the safety zone in industry practice, this paper 
delivers a remarkable research work providing ship designers, owners and rule-makers 
with an insight into the potential extent of flammable gas dispersion through the case 
studies with two representative ship types. The case studies dealt with the event of 
accidental LNG leaks in accordance with different bunkering conditions and accidental 
scenarios. 
The main objective of the present study has been to examine the characteristics of 
leaked-gas dispersion in a ship to ship LNG bunkering and to determine a safety zone 
where the hazards can be minimized. In this context, research findings can be summarized 
that the geometry of the ships and the state of cargo shipment are important parameters 
in establishing the safety zone as gas congestion/ventilation are significantly affected by 
the surrounding conditions. 
It is recommended to devise ways to reduce the leak rate and leak duration in the 
bunkering process so as to minimize the impact of accidental LNG release. It is also 
important to emphasize that the cargo loading should be carefully planned during the 
bunkering since the extent of gas spread may be affected by the ship¶V draught and the 
surrounding conditions exposed to the leaked gas. Wind speed and wind direction also 
need to be cautiously considered when determining the safe zone for LNG bunkering so 
that the hazards associated with leak-gas dispersion can be minimized. 
As would be expected, research findings showed that the leakage amount is the most 
influential parameter in determining the safety zone. However, the core of research 
findings was placed on the fact that that the effect of the environmental conditions and 
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ship geometry are also essential elements when establishing the safety zone. It is believed 
that this suggestion will contribute to enhancing the safety of LNG bunkering by 
establishing the safety zone in a more realistic way to supplement the shortcomings of 
the current practice where there has been a tendency to disregard or under-estimate such 
conditions. 
It is obvious that the parameters affecting the hazards are the subject variables as 
applied in this paper. Meanwhile, the present study was aiming at obtaining the general 
trends and relationships between LNG bunkering parameters. Considering that the 
industry practice is lacking in terms of determining the safety zone for the LNG 
bunkering, it is believed that the insights developed in the paper may provide useful 
information as a corner stone. Nevertheless, in order to quantify the extent of safety zones 
in a more realistic way, a probabilistic analysis needs to be undertaken with a set of 
credible scenarios that represent all of the possible events involving extensive variations 
of influential parameters. 
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